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3 The Impact of Health Care Costs 
and Medicaid on SSI Participation
Aaron S. Yelowitz 
University of California, Los Angeles
From 1984 to 1993, the disabled Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) population grew at an annual average rate of about 9.2 percent 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1994). This chapter asks whether the 
availability of public health insurance through the Medicaid program 
contributed to the caseload growth. I specifically examine the effect of 
increasing Medicaid's value on SSI participation. I focus my analysis 
largely on the working-age population by examining the SSI participa 
tion behavior of adults between the ages of 18 and 64 using the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data spanning the years 1987 to 1992.
Unlike the dramatic Medicaid program reforms for pregnant women 
and children who might otherwise be eligible for Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), and for the elderly who might otherwise 
be eligible for SSI, the extensions of Medicaid for the disabled during 
the 1980s were relatively minor. 1 Although I cannot use the type of leg 
islative variation that has been used in other research to assess the 
importance of Medicaid for other populations, I will assess the impor-
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tance of health insurance for the disabled using variation in Medicaid 
expenditure across states.
The primary estimation technique (instrumental variables) leads to 
the conclusion that the rising value of Medicaid contributed greatly to 
the increase in the SSI rolls in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
instrumental variable estimates suggest that around one-quarter of the 
increase can be explained by this. In addition, the effects of Medicaid 
are much more important for the white population than the African- 
American population. The remainder of the paper is organized as fol 
lows. The next section provides some background on SSI and Medic- 
aid and reviews the economic importance of Medicaid for other 
populations, followed by presentation of some theoretical consider 
ations. Next, a descriptive analysis of the CPS data is presented. The 
regression results follow, and a final section explores policy implica 
tions.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Background on the SSI Adult Disabled and Medicaid Program
SSI was introduced in 1974, replacing state-run programs for the 
needy aged, blind, and disabled. In 1993, $23.5 billion was spent on 
SSI cash benefits for these groups. While the number of elderly and 
blind SSI participants remained stable, the number of disabled SSI par 
ticipants increased from 2.9 million recipients in 1988 to 4.0 million 
recipients in 1992.
In addition to having limited income and assets, an adult between 
the ages of 18 and 64 must be disabled to qualify for SSI. For purposes 
of eligibility, disabled individuals are those "unable to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determined physi 
cal or mental impairment expected to result in death or that has lasted, 
or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 
months." While this definition may appear to be quite objective, eligi 
bility standards, especially for mental impairments, have changed due 
to legislative, regulatory, and judicial action (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1995).
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Besides receiving a monthly cash supplement, Medicaid provides 
the disabled adult with a second valuable benefit from SSI participa 
tion. Each state's Medicaid program offers its own package of covered 
medical services within broad federal guidelines. Federal law requires 
states to offer eight mandatory services and allows them of offer thirty- 
one optional services. 2 Although only 15 percent of all Medicaid bene 
ficiaries are disabled, they account for a much larger share of Medicaid 
costs. The average spending on disabled beneficiaries amounted to 
$7,717 per beneficiary in fiscal year 1993. 3 In contrast, average spend 
ing on nondisabled recipients was $2,233.
For disabled adults, there is little opportunity to receive public 
health insurance except by participating in SSI. A notable exception to 
this is section 1619 of the SSI law, which is intended to remove some 
of the work disincentives for the disabled. Section 1619(a) of the law 
provides continuation of cash benefits on the basis of disability even if 
earnings are at or above the "substantial gainful activity" level as long 
there is not a medical improvement in the disabling condition. Under 
section 1619(b), disabled individuals can continue to be eligible for 
Medicaid even if their earnings take them past the SSI breakeven point. 
These provisions turn out to be quite minor, however. In September 
1992, just 48,000 of the 2.6 million disabled adults between the ages of 
18 and 64 participated in either the 1619(a) or 1619(b) program (U.S. 
House of Representatives 1993).
Prior Studies of Medicaid and Welfare Participation
While the Medicaid program was introduced thirty years ago, and 
the program costs have been soaring, only recently has the program 
garnered much academic interest. The key obstacle in assessing Med 
icaid 's impact on outcomes such as welfare participation has been that 
eligibility for Medicaid and cash benefits had been highly correlated. 
The reason that most of the recent academic interest on Medicaid has 
focused on its interaction with AFDC and not SSI is due to the belief 
that the behavioral elasticities of the blind, elderly, and disabled are 
extremely small.
Several studies have examined the impact of Medicaid on AFDC 
participation and work effort. While some of the earlier studies found 
that Medicaid had a surprisingly small effect on the AFDC and labor
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market decisions of female-headed households, more recent work has 
found larger effects.
Blank (1989) exploits the fact that the average Medicaid expenditure 
differs tremendously across states. 4 She used data on 475 female- 
headed households from the 1980 National Medical Care Utilization 
and Expenditure Study (NMCUES). She finds that health problems 
significantly increased AFDC participation, but that program rules— 
such as the presence of the Medically Needy (MN) program or the 
value of Medicaid insurance coverage—had insignificant effects on 
AFDC usage. The effects on the MN program are not necessarily sur 
prising because eight of the thirty MN states in her sample had a pro 
tected income level below the maximum AFDC payment level. More 
surprising was the robustness of the finding that the mean state-specific 
Medicaid insurance value did not affect AFDC participation.
Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) construct an individual-specific valuation 
of health insurance to surmount Medicaid's collinearity with AFDC 
eligibility and benefits levels. They note that a Medicaid variable that is 
constructed from a state-specific average may not proxy for the valua 
tion of the Medicaid program by any particular family. They link 545 
female-headed households from the 1984 Survey of Income and Pro 
gram Participation to the 1980 NMCUES for health information to 
construct a "heterogeneity" index for Medicaid's value based on differ 
ent health characteristics of the woman and her family. This index 
yields enormous variation in Medicaid: the total actuarial values range 
from $2.18 to $2,740 per individual, which is then combined across 
family members to get a family-specific value. Using this approach, 
they find sizable effects of Medicaid on labor market outcomes: if all 
workers were covered by private health insurance, AFDC participation 
would fall by 7.3 percentage points and the employment rate would 
rise by 16.0 percentage points.
Yelowitz (1995) examines expansions in Medicaid eligibility tar 
geted toward young children between 1988 and 1991. These expan 
sions linked Medicaid eligibility to the federal poverty line rather than 
a state's AFDC income eligibility limit, thus offering an incentive to 
leave welfare. He finds that these reforms significantly decreased 
AFDC participation and increased labor force participation. Among 
female-headed households, the effects were largest for divorced and 
separated women, and negligible for never-married women. Yelowitz
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(1996b) examines recent changes in the Medicaid program on the SSI 
participation of the elderly. By using the implementation of a buy-in 
program for Medicare in the 1980s (which offered a substitute for the 
cost-sharing provisions of Medicaid), he finds that Medicaid has a big 
ger impact on exits from SSI for the elderly than the expansions tar 
geted towards children had on exits from AFDC for female heads.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section briefly explores how Medicaid may influence the SSI 
participation decision. The disabled individual maximizes a utility 
function, U(C, L), which is a function of consumption goods (C) and 
leisure (L). The price of consumption goods (Pc) is normalized to $1 
per unit, while the price of leisure is simply the wage rate (W). He is 
given a time endowment (T) which he can allocate between work and 
leisure. He may also receive nonlabor income (AT), for instance from 
the earnings of his spouse. Therefore his full budget constraint is 
defined as
(1) PcC + WL = WT + N.
In Figure 3.1, this is represented as the segment ABC. Given this bud 
get constraint, the consumer maximizes his utility.
By introducing the SSI system into the model, the government 
essentially changes the budget constraint. The program offers a grant 
(G), which was $669 per month for a married couple in 1994, and 
reduces this grant for earning income in the labor market. This reduc 
tion, known as the "benefit reduction rate" (T), is 50 percent of earned 
income. Therefore the net wage falls to (1 - T) W along the initial part 
of the budget constraint.
The final institutional feature to consider is incorporating Medicaid. 
Broadly speaking, Medicaid is received when the individual is on SSI 
and is lost in its entirety after leaving SSL This discrete drop in benefits 
is known as the "Medicaid notch"—the design of the program creates a 
portion of the budget constraint where we would predict that no utility- 
maximizing person would choose. Consider an individual who lives in
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a state where Medicaid is valued at some small amount, M1 —this can 
be thought of as the dollars the family would have to spend on medical 
expenses in the absence of insurance. His budget constraint now is rep 
resented by ADEFC in Figure 3.1. Consider a second individual who 
lives in a different state that has the same SSI grant but a more gener 
ous Medicaid program, so that M2>M1 . In this state, the budget con 
straint is represented by AGHFC. 5
Given these different budget constraints, we can predict that the 
more valuable the Medicaid package, the higher the SSI participation 
rate. This arises for two reasons. First, increasing the value of Medic- 
aid makes SSI more attractive to those who are ineligible based on 
their earnings. In this case, some people in this group may reduce their 
earnings in order to qualify. Second, increasing the value of Medicaid 
may encourage individuals who were previously eligible but not partic 
ipating to join the program. In this case, the net benefit may not ini 
tially outweigh the stigma cost of participating, but it could after the 
value of Medicaid increases.
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
I use the 1988-1993 March Annual Demographic File, which pro 
vides retrospective information on family income, health insurance 
coverage, and program participation from 1987 to 1992 on the nonin- 
stitutionalized population. I choose to begin the analysis using the 
March 1988 CPS onward because several additional questions on 
health insurance coverage were added that make these later surveys 
less comparable to earlier ones. 6 1 end the analysis with the March 
1993 CPS because the last data on Medicaid average expenditure (the 
key independent variable) is for fiscal year 1992. 7
Table 3.1 shows sequential selection criteria and the number of 
observations eliminated from each screen for each CPS year. I use 
about one-third of the roughly 900,000 observations contained in the 
1988-1993 CPS years. The nine most important exclusions were being 
over the age of 64, being under the age of 18, living in Arizona, having 
imputed information on SSI or Medicaid receipt, having an imputed 
spouse number, being a woman under the age of 45, being a race other
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Table 3.1 Sample Selection Criteria, Current Population Survey: March 
Annual Demographic File
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than African American or white, living in a single-parent household, 
and having more related children than own children in a family. 8 The 
CPS is, perhaps, more useful than other household data sets because 
only a small fraction of the adult population participates in SSI-dis- 
abled.
Table 3.2 presents some summary statistics for the variables used in 
the analysis for the entire population, SSI recipients and SSI nonrecipi- 
ents. Among the entire group, SSI participation is 1.15 percent over the 
time period, while Medicaid participation is nearly double that number, 
2.24 percent. Even with the exclusions of single-parent households 
above, it is still possible that some families have access to Medicaid 
from alternative sources rather than through the SSI disabled program. 
Part of the gap between the two participation rates could result from 
the existence of the Medically Needy program or the General Assis 
tance program. Among SSI recipients, more than 90 percent also 
receive Medicaid. There are at least two reasons why Medicaid partici 
pation may not be complete for SSI recipients. First, survey respon 
dents might only report that they received Medicaid if they actually 
went to the hospital. Second, because a number of states require a sec 
ond application for Medicaid, the respondent may not apply for bene 
fits until they become sick. This table also shows that Medicare 
participation averages 28.2 percent for SSI recipients and 2.2 percent 
for nonrecipients. Since an SSI recipient is much more likely to partic 
ipate in the disability insurance (DI) program than the average member 
of the population, a prolonged spell can result in Medicare coverage. A 
nonrecipient can also qualify for DI and thereby qualify for Medicare.
The next five variables in Table 3.2 represent state-level policy vari 
ables for the Medicaid and SSI program. 9 The average Medicaid 
expenditure for disabled SSI recipients is more than $2,000 higher than 
for elderly SSI recipients and more than $2,400 higher than for blind 
SSI recipients. The real Medicaid expenditure also exceeds the maxi 
mum annual SSI grant (which includes state supplements) by more 
than $800. There appear to be small differences in the average levels 
across SSI recipients and nonrecipients: nonrecipients appear to live in 
states with a higher Medicaid expenditure and substantially higher SSI 
grant. On the surface, these differences in average expenditure on Med 
icaid and average SSI benefits would suggest that higher benefits 
reduce participation. There are a variety of other factors, such as atti-
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NOTES: Author's tabulations of the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Annual Demo 
graphic File. Standard deviation in parentheses. Total number of observations is 297,930, of 
which 3,414 are SSI recipients.
Growth in Disability Benefits 119
tudes toward welfare participation, that also vary across states and are 
correlated with benefit levels.
Finally, Table 3.2 presents several demographic characteristics that 
are included in the regression analysis. On average, SSI recipients are 
older and less educated. They are also more likely to be single, have 
fewer children, and be female. Finally, there are large differences in the 
take-up (and presumably availability) of private insurance coverage. 
While less than one-tenth of SSI recipients had coverage, more than 
three-quarters of the nonrecipient sample had private coverage.
Table 3.3 illustrates trends in SSI participation from 1987 to 1992 
for the entire sample and for several demographic groups. For the 
entire sample, the SSI participation rate increased steadily, from 0.98 
percent in 1987 to 1.27 percent in 1992. Perhaps the most striking fea 
ture of this table is that the level of participation for the African-Amer 
ican population is more than three times as high as for the white 
population. The trend in participation, however, shows no consistent 
pattern—the participation rate falls from 3.07 percent in 1987 to 2.81 
percent in 1989, and rises to 3.33 percent in 1992. The trend for whites 
is more clear: the SSI participation rate increased by more than one- 
third between 1987 and 1992, from 0.81 percent to 1.09 percent, 
despite varying economic conditions. The different trend foreshadow 
the different empirical findings for whites and African Americans in 
the regression analysis below. 10 Finally the table shows that SSI partic 
ipation rate for adult women was more than 1 percentage point higher 
than the rate for men, though both groups show a similar increased 
trend in participation.
It is important to note that program participation in the CPS, as with 
many other household surveys, appears to be underreported. The 
national SSI participation rate in the adult population was 1.75 percent 
in 1992, compared to 1.27 percent in the CPS (U.S. House of Repre 
sentatives 1993). While participation rates also appear to be consis 
tently under-reported in most states, the discrepancies vary. The 
participation rate is underreported by 0.07 percentage points in Florida, 
by between 0.32 to 0.48 percentage points in Illinois, New York, and 
Texas, and by 0.95 percentage points in California. If the stigma of 
reporting program participation to a survey taker varies across states, 
then the patterns we see across states would be likely to emerge.





























































































NOTE: Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.4 illustrates trends in the average real SSI benefit level and 
real Medicaid expenditure from 1987 to 1992. 11 The average benefit 
level is computed from the CPS, based on the respondent's state of res 
idence, time period, and marital status. Clearly, two different trends 
emerge here. Real SSI cash benefits remain largely unchanged. This 
may not be too surprising since the federal benefit level is indexed for 
inflation. Medicaid expenditure increased by more than $3,000 in real 
terms over this period. This pattern in Medicaid expenditure is similar 
to the pattern in overall SSI participation rates, and is at least sugges 
tive that a link between the two trends may exist.
Table 3.4 Trends in SSI Benefits and Medicaid Expenditures
Average Medicaid 



















NOTES; Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey All values are in 1990 
dollars. Medicaid expenditures is deflated by the medical CPI.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimates Using Average Medicaid 
Expenditure of Disabled
For ease of interpretation, I present results from a linear probability 
model. The coefficients from the models below therefore may be inter 
preted as percentage point changes. The basic estimating equation is 
denoted by
(2) SSI.PARTj = Po + PjMEDICAID.BEN,, + (32SSI_BEN,r
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The subscript * refers to individuals, j to states, and t to time periods. 
The outcome, SSI participation (SSI_PART) is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the respondent participated in the program in the previous year. 
Two key policy variables that are expected to increase SSI participation 
are the average real Medicaid expenditure (MEDICAID_BEN) and the 
average real SSI benefit (SSI_BEN). I2 The vector X contains several 
individual-level variables that may also influence SSI participation, 
including the respondent's age and its square, race, residence in a cen 
tral city, education, marital status, number of children present, gender, 
and veteran status. 13 In addition, I amend this basic specification to 
allow for nationally uniform, time-varying shocks to SSI participation 
through the inclusion of five time dummies, as well as time-invariant, 
state-specific shocks to SSI participation through the inclusion of 
forty-nine state dummies. The coefficients P0, pj, p2 > Ps> 5/» and 5, are 
to be estimated, and et- is an error term.
By including state-fixed effects (SJ) and time-fixed effects (Tt\ the 
regression framework accounts for some of the other factors that may 
lead to an increase in SSI participation. I am able to control for the 
effects of the business cycle (at the national level) with the time dum 
mies. Since other studies have demonstrated that this influences dis 
ability insurance applications, it may be reasonable to expect it to 
influence SSI participation. If changing economic conditions are corre 
lated with Medicaid expenditure, the results will be biased by not 
accounting for this omitted variable.
Three other explanations for SSI growth, which essentially vary 
over time, are also controlled for. First, SSI spell lengths may have 
increased in duration because the Social Security Administration was 
performing fewer disability reviews. Second, some medical break 
throughs may have allowed disabled people to live longer than they 
otherwise would have (U.S. General Accounting Office 1995). Third, 
there has been growth over time in outreach efforts for SSI.
Several unmodeled or unobservable variables that differ across 
states could bias the results. As shown earlier, the SSI reporting behav 
ior in the CPS data varies by state. If admitting program participation 
represents permanent differences in attitudes that vary by state, includ 
ing state-fixed effects will account for this. In addition, the availability 
of Medicaid coverage varies across states, and this could affect SSI 
participation. For instance, a poor adult may be able to receive health
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insurance coverage through the Medically Needy program or the Gen 
eral Assistance program. It is possible that these variables are corre 
lated with Medicaid expenditure and affect SSI participation. For 
instance, more liberal states may have these optional programs, which 
would tend to discourage SSI participation, and have more generous 
Medicaid services, which would increase average Medicaid expendi 
ture. This type of modeled difference across states would likely lead to 
the conclusion that increased Medicaid expenditure reduces SSI partic 
ipation. To the extent that the MN and GA program remain fixed over 
the time period, this heterogeneity would be accounted for with state- 
fixed effects. It is plausible that the programs may have changed over 
time, however. Several states, including Michigan, eliminated their GA 
program in the early 1990s. If this program change is correlated with 
Medicaid expenditure, then even the model that includes state- and 
time-fixed effects will be biased. To account for these possibilities, I 
include four additional variables that vary over time at the state level: 
1) the Medically Needy protected income level for one person, 2) mea 
sures of the state unemployment rate, 3) labor force participation, and 
4) a measure of cuts in a state's General Assistance program. 14
The results in the first column of Table 3.5 show that the OLS esti 
mate of Pi is statistically insignificant and economically unimportant. 
The point estimate suggests that increasing Medicaid by $1,000 leads 
to an increase in SSI participation of 0.005 percentage points. Since 
Table 3.4 illustrates that average Medicaid expenditure for the entire 
sample rose in real terms from $6,700 in 1987 to $9,730 in 1992, this 
coefficient estimate implies that increased Medicaid expenditure raised 
the probability of SSI participation by 0.015 percentage points. Since 
SSI participation for the whole sample increased from 0.98 to 1.27 per 
cent (or 0.290 percentage points), the OLS estimate implies that rising 
health care costs can explain less than six percent (0.015 divided by 
0.290) of the rise in SSI participation.
On the other hand, this model shows that increasing the SSI benefit 
increases SSI participation, though it is only marginally significant. 
Raising the benefit by $1,000 results in an increase in SSI participation 
of 0.053 percentage points. While this estimate could be an explanation 
for the rise in participation, Table 3.4 shows little change in cash bene 
fits over time. The CPS estimates indicate that from 1987 to 1992, SSI 
benefits fell slightly in real terms from $7,211 to $7,133. While the
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Table 3.5 Linear Probability Model from Full Current Population 
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Table 3.5 (continued)_____________________________
(I) (2) 

















NOTES. Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey. Standard errors in 
parentheses All models also include state-fixed effects (49), time-fixed effects (5), and a constant 
term Instruments in column 2 are average Medicaid expenditures for the blind and elderly
cash benefits increase the probability of participation, they cannot 
explain the growth in participation. The table also shows the effect of a 
third policy variable, whether the respondent lived in a Section 209(b) 
state. Since very few states changed status from Section 209(b) to Sec 
tion 1634 during the period, the effect of 209(b) status is essentially 
subsumed in the state-fixed effect. The estimate in this column is not 
significantly different from zero and economically small.
The labor market variables enter the model with the expected signs: 
increases in the unemployment rate raise SSI participation (though it is 
imprecisely estimated), while increasing labor force participation low 
ers SSI participation. Not surprisingly, the MN variable is imprecisely 
estimated: after controlling for state-fixed effects, there is little inde 
pendent variation in the income limit. Contrary to expectations, the 
parameterization of the GA cut variable is "wrong-signed" and margin 
ally significant. While larger GA cuts (indicating a larger positive 
value) should presumably increase SSI participation (and therefore 
enter into the model with a positive sign), instead the sign is negative.
Education and family structure appear to play important roles in SSI 
participation. Relative to those with a college degree, individuals with 
less than nine years of education are 5.2 percentage points more likely 
to participate in SSI, while those with less than twelve years are 1.8 
percentage points more likely to participate. In addition, those who 
only completed high school are significantly more likely to participate
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in the SSI disabled program than those who entered college, but the 
economic impact is not as dramatic as for the other educational groups. 
Being married lowers SSI participation by 3 percentage points, while 
having an additional young child increases the probability of participa 
tion. The positive effect of young children may indicate a "spillover" 
effect on SSI participation resulting from the Supreme Court's Sullivan 
v. Zebley decision. It is well known that the number of children on SSI 
skyrocketed during this time frame, and once a household enrolled one 
member on SSI, its propensity to enroll other members may increase.
The signs of the other demographic and location-specific character 
istics enter into SSI participation largely as expected. SSI participation 
increases with age, but at a decreasing rate. Since many physical dis 
abilities may not occur until later ages, this finding makes sense. Rela 
tive to whites, being African American raises the probability of SSI 
participation by 1.64 percentage points. This is consistent with the con 
tinually higher levels of participation in Table 3.3. Living in a central 
city raises SSI participation. This may occur for two reasons. First, 
those in central cities may have more access to welfare and social secu 
rity offices or health care facilities, which lowers the transaction costs 
of SSI participation and raises the value of Medicaid, respectively. Sec 
ond, if living in a central city means that individuals have better infor 
mation about the programs, they would be more likely to participate. 
Finally, being male or being a veteran significantly lowers SSI partici 
pation.
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimates Using Average Medicaid 
Expenditure of Elderly and Blind as Instruments
The prior estimates using variation in disabled expenditure may be 
biased if changes in the underlying health of the SSI population 
affected both Medicaid's value and SSI participation. If the eligibility 
criteria for disability becomes less strict, for example, so that people 
who were previously found to be ineligible are now deemed eligible 
for SSI, then the former estimates of Pj would be too small. In the 
Supreme Court's Sullivan v. Zebley decision, such a reevaluation 
occurred for children, and this may have had spillovers into the adult 
population. 15 In addition, if states attempted to shift their GA and MN 
beneficiaries onto the SSI rolls, and if these groups happened to be
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healthier, the OLS results would be biased. In this case, the marginal 
disabled SSI recipient will likely incur less health care expenditure 
than the average recipient, so that average expenditure falls while SSI 
participation increases. This would lead to a spurious negative correla 
tion (which in turn biases the coefficient downward). 16
To correct for this simultaneity bias, I instrument for average Medic- 
aid expenditure of the disabled in each state-year cell with the corre 
sponding average expenditure of the elderly and of the blind. These 
variables reflect different aspects of the state's Medicaid program that 
influence its value, such as variation in health care prices, access to 
care, and scope of services. Since the criteria to qualify as a blind or 
elderly recipient is more objective, these instruments are unlikely to be 
correlated with changing definitions of disability. 17
At this point, it is important to discuss the validity of the instrumen 
tal variables. Expenditure for neither the blind nor elderly fully cap 
tures the breadth of a state's Medicaid program—the blind tend to be 
healthy, and the differences in elderly expenditure may reflect differ 
ences in nursing home access. This does not invalidate the estimation 
technique, however. Two conditions must hold: the instruments must 
be correlated with the endogenous regressor and uncorrelated with the 
error term. While the expenditure on the elderly and blind is not per 
fectly correlated with expenditure on the disabled, they are extremely 
powerful instruments—the first stage F-statistic (predicting Medicaid 
expenditure for the disabled) is over 10,000. In any case, if the instru 
ments were weak predictors, the instrumental variable estimates would 
be biased toward the OLS estimates so I would be unlikely to find any 
effect of Medicaid.
By instrumenting, the coefficient estimate in the second column of 
Table 3.5 increases dramatically, consistent with changing the budget 
constraint in Figure 3.1. Increasing Medicaid expenditure by $1,000 is 
now associated with an increase in the probability of SSI participation 
by 0.024 percentage points. Again, taking the rise in Medicaid expen 
diture from Table 3.4, this estimate implies that rising health care costs 
from 1987 to 1992 raised the probability of participation by 0.070 per 
centage points. Since the total increase in SSI participation was 0.290 
percentage points, the point estimate indicates that rising health care 
costs can explain around one-quarter of the rise in SSI participation. 
The point estimates on the other explanatory variables remain largely
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unchanged, both in significance and in magnitude. By comparing the 
coefficient estimates on Medicaid expenditure and SSI benefit levels, a 
$1,000 increase in SSI leads to a similar rise in participation as a 
$2,170 increase in Medicaid expenditure.
Recall that Table 3.3 showed dramatic differences in SSI participa 
tion rates across racial lines. This may suggest that rising health care 
costs have different effects on the African-American and white popula 
tions. The two columns in Table 3.6 divide the sample into whites and 
African Americans, respectively. Again, I instrument for average dis 
abled Medicaid expenditure with average blind and average elderly 
Medicaid expenditure in each state-time cell.
The Medicaid coefficient estimates for the white population are 
slightly larger than the IV estimates from the second column of Table 
3.5. The effect of Medicaid expenditure increases slightly, and the 
coefficient is more precisely estimated than in the full sample. Cash 
benefits appear to play a less important role in SSI participation than 
for the full sample. In contrast, Medicaid appears to play little role in 
the SSI participation decision of African Americans, though the coeffi 
cient is imprecisely estimated. While the policy variables explain little 
of the SSI participation decision for African Americans, the demo 
graphic variables on education, family structure, gender, and veteran 
status are all significant predictors of participation.
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This chapter finds that rising health insurance costs are an important 
reason for participation in the SSI-disabled program. By using a large, 
nationally representative household data set, I find that around one- 
quarter of the rise in SSI participation may be due to increases in the 
value of Medicaid. The effects appear to be concentrated in the white 
population, not the African-American population.
I show that ordinary least squares estimates of Medicaid effect pro 
duce badly biased estimates, since the health status of the disabled 
population was changing. The estimates using instrumental variables 
produce much stronger positive effects of Medicaid on SSI participa 
tion. Is it reasonable to assume that the health status of the disabled
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NOTES: Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Standard errors in 
parentheses. In addition to the coefficients shown, all models also include state-fixed effects (49), 
time-fixed effects (5), and a constant term. Instruments in columns 1 and 2 are average Medicaid 
expenditures for the blind and elderly.
changed so dramatically while the health status of elderly and blind did 
not? Knowing the answer to this question is vital for assessing the 
validity of the instruments. It is difficult to believe that the health status 
of the blind changed dramatically from 1987 to 1992, and the instru 
mental variables results do not change markedly by only using the 
Medicaid expenditure for the blind as an instrument. On the other 
hand, it is possible the health status of the elderly on SSI may have 
changed because the Qualified Medicaid Beneficiary (QMB) program 
in the 1980s and 1990s offered an incentive for the elderly to leave SSI 
and still retain Medicaid. Around 1.4 million elderly were enrolled in 
this program in December 1992; however it is not known whether the 
health status of former SSI recipients who left and enrolled in the 
QMB program was better or worse than the average SSI recipient.
Are the estimated effects too large? At this point, it is important to 
remember about the recent empirical findings on other Medicaid popu 
lations. In other work, Yelowitz (1995,1996b) finds significant effects 
on AFDC participation for female household heads and on SSI partici 
pation for elderly households. In those studies, the policy experiment 
was somewhat different from this study, however. The policy changes 
for young children and for the elderly offered Medicaid benefits with 
out necessarily applying for AFDC or SSI, which therefore offered 
incentives to leave those welfare programs. In a closer comparison to 
this study, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) attempt to value Medicaid and find 
strong effects on AFDC participation for female-headed households. It 
is plausible to think that health insurance plays a more important role 
in the economic decision making of disabled adults than either female
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household heads or elderly households. Therefore, the stronger results 
here appear reasonable.
The findings have several policy implications for program design. 
Since Medicaid is an important determinant of SSI participation, offer 
ing health insurance without the need to participate in SSI may reduce 
total costs. This could occur because disabled adults may then forego 
the cash benefits from SSI—which amounts to more than $20 billion 
annually. On the other hand, some disabled adults who were not previ 
ously participating in SSI, because the program may be stigmatizing, 
may decide to participate in a Medicaid-only program, which could 
increase costs. In theory, this could occur through the Medically Needy 
program. The program typically has lower income limits than SSI and 
fewer covered services under Medicaid than for categorically needy 
recipients. Thus, Medically Needy may not offer enough of an incen 
tive for the disabled to leave. Therefore modifications of existing SSI 
program rules concerning Medicaid may have an impact on total costs.
Notes
1. See Yelowitz (1995, 1996b) for explanations of the Medicaid reforms for children 
and the elderly, respectively.
2. Required coverage includes inpatient and outpatient hospital services, rural health 
clinic services, federally qualified health center services, laboratory and x-ray ser 
vices, nursing facility services for individuals under age 21, family planning ser 
vices, physicians' services, home health services for any individual entitled to 
nursing facility care, nurse-midwife services, and services of certified nurse prac 
titioners.
3. These expenditure numbers include spending on intermediate care facilities and 
skilled nursing homes. I believe that it is important to include these numbers 
because access to these facilities is indeed part of Medicaid's value. While it is 
certainly true that only a small portion of the population will be institutionalized, 
it is also true that a small portion will use any particular Medicaid service. There 
fore excluding this expenditure seems ad hoc.
4. Winkler (1991) takes a similar approach.
5. It is not necessarily clear that an increase in Medicaid spending per beneficiary 
translates into an increase in the value to individuals, however. For example, as 
real payments to doctors or other service providers increase, the individual getting 
the same service at higher cost may not have greater value. It is much more diffi 
cult to obtain a family- or individual-level valuation, although other studies, such 
as Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) have tried.
132 Yelowitz
6. These questions specifically dealt with the health insurance status of children in 
the household. Survey respondents were effectively asked twice about the health 
insurance coverage of children in the household.
7. Furthermore, I restrict my attention to adults who would be unlikely to collect 
Medicaid from a program other than SSI. Thus, I exclude single-parent house 
holds with children under age 18 (who may be eligible for Medicaid under the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC, program). I also eliminate 
women between 18 and 44 from my sample. For this group, the primary health 
insurance expense would be due to pregnancy, and other reforms in the Medicaid 
program from 1984 onward could bias the results for SSI participation. To accu 
rately examine the impact of Medicaid for these groups, not only would the 
expansions need to be parameterized, but the joint AFDC, SSI, and labor force 
participation decisions would have to be modeled, which is beyond the scope of 
the current paper. See Cume and Gruber (1994) for an analysis of these Medicaid 
pregnancy expansions.
8. I follow Winkler (1991) in excluding Arizona from the analysis. Arizona had a 
Medicaid demonstration project for part of the time period I examine, and data on 
average Medicaid expenditure are not available.
9. All of these variables were obtained from various editions of U.S. House of Rep 
resentatives (1993).
10. Although the difference for African Americans is striking, it is not all that surpris 
ing for a means-tested program.
11. These are deflated using the CPI-U for the SSI benefit level and the medical ser 
vices CPI for Medicaid.
12. I include a third state-specific variable, whether or not the respondent lived in a 
section 209(b) state. Several states changed status between section 209(b) and 
section 1634 between 1987 and 1992, but in models with state-fixed effects, this 
effect is never reliably estimated. I would expect the coefficient to be negative— 
living in a state with extra application procedures for Medicaid increases transac 
tion costs and thus lowers SSI participation.
13. I include many of the same demographic variables that Winkler (1991) includes in 
her AFDC participation equation using the CPS. In addition, I tried restricting the 
sample to adults aged 22 to 64 since some rules which govern the SSI eligibility 
for a child who reaches the ages of 18 to 21 have changed over time. The results 
on the Medicaid and SSI variables are similar to the coefficients reported here.
14. These variables are carefully explained in Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2). It is possi 
ble that the inclusion of the labor market and General Assistance variables reflect 
outcomes of the same utility maximization process that lead to SSI participation, 
since these are constructed from participation rates rather than changes in the bud 
get constraint. However, it is more likely that they are instead driven by changes 
in the business cycle, so that they are not endogenous, at least at the person-level.
15. The Supreme Court ruled that disability standards for children may not be nar 
rower than those applied for adults. As a result, eligibility criteria for children are 
based on a child's developmental delay and limitations on the child's ability to 
engage in age-appropnate activities of daily living. This has increased the number
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of children classified as disabled. Prior to 1990, the same disability criteria that 
applied to adults were also applied to children.
16. This argument suggests growth in SSI-disabled expenditure should be slower than 
other groups who use similar Medicaid services, for whom the health mix was not 
changing. My calculations show average expenditure on the disabled grew 41 per 
cent in real terms from 1987 to 1993. The growth rates for the blind and elderly 
were much greater, 77 and 144 percent, respectively.
17. An aged person age 65 and over with limited income and resources can qualify 
under the aged SSI program, while blind individuals are defined as those with 
20/200 vision or less with the use of a correcting lens in their better eye, or 
those with tunnel vision of 20 degrees or less.
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Comments on Chapter 3
Barbara Wolfe 
University of Wisconsin-Madison
I like the paper by Aaron Yelowitz (Chapter 3) and believe its gen 
eral finding that Medicaid is a significant factor in explaining the 
recent growth in numbers of adult Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
recipients. We know that Medicaid has been growing—from 22.9 mil 
lion recipients ($48.7 billion expenditures) in 1988 to 35.1 million 
recipients ($107.9 billion expenditures) in 1994. Medical expenditures 
have increased tremendously over the period studied, and an existing 
body of literature on other population groups finds similar results: that 
publicly provided health insurance is an important determinant of indi 
vidual choices concerning both age of retirement and applications for 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
The theoretical framework is one established in the literature and 
makes sense as applied here. It is a choice-based, utility-maximization 
model in which the provision of Medicaid (an either/or or a 0/1 choice, 
the so-called Medicaid notch) is incorporated into an individual's 
choice, selecting the option that maximizes well-being. Well-being is 
proxied by potential income (including the value of benefits in-kind) in 
each of the two options, SSI with Medicaid versus working. Health is 
not fully incorporated into the model; Yelowitz discusses the need to 
incorporate health into his model, but at the moment, well-being under 
the work option depends only on earnings for each individual. Health 
limitations are not incorporated, and although Yelowitz mentions this 
omission, he never discusses how it might influence the model. For 
consistency, he needs to incorporate the probability of being offered 
private insurance and a value for it if it is offered by an employer.
One further comment on the model is that most states have a spend- 
down provision that allows certain persons to obtain Medicaid without 
being on SSI, and many states offer medical care coverage through 
another program, General Assistance (GA). Hence, a number of per 
sons are potentially eligible for Medicaid or GA, and the probability of
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eligibility and the speed by which they could be found eligible are also 
factors to be considered. These factors are not incorporated into the 
model.
In regard to the data and empirical work, most of the exclusions 
seem reasonable, except perhaps for those eliminated because they 
have imputed information—but this is a problem that plagues all of us 
doing empirical research. In this case such exclusion seems quite 
minor and pertains to a very small proportion of the observations.
There are a few puzzles in the data.
1. The author reports Medicaid expenditures for disabled persons 
that are too high according to official figures in Health United 
States, 1995. In these official statistics, average spending in 1993 
was $7,706, compared to Yelowitz's reported value of $9,226. 
The author states that his figure includes nursing home expendi 
tures (see note 3 in Chapter 3), but so do the official statistics as 
reported in Table 139 in Health United States, 1995, which are- 
based on Health Care Financing Administration data. A similar 
issue arises with the data used for Medicaid in the study. Why 
these differences?
2. It would be meaningful to see a comparison of the insurance cov 
erage in a matched sample according to education, age, and mari 
tal status. I do not think that a comparison to the total U.S. 
population is very informative.
Many of the results seem plausible. A few raise questions about the 
reasonableness of the estimation. Perhaps the most puzzling involves 
the dummy variable included as an indicator of 209(b) states, which 
are more stringent with regard to Medicaid eligibility: not all persons 
eligible for SSI are eligible for Medicaid. This leads to an expected 
negative sign on the variable for a 209(b) state, yet the result is posi 
tive, though not significant. The other puzzle is why the number of 
children should be positive when there are no dependent benefits asso 
ciated with SSI and, hence, no additional benefit to families with chil 
dren. The author's explanation of a link to the Zebley case seems 
inadequate (unlikely) as an explanation.
Yelowitz appropriately raises the issue of endogeneity of the value 
of Medicaid. His argument is that if the benefits become more gener-
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ous, an increased number of marginal persons (i.e., those who tend to 
be healthier and use less medical care) will be attracted to SSI and 
Medicaid. This means that as more people join the ranks of those on 
these programs, the expected benefit, at least as measured in this study, 
will fall. This fall will not reflect decreases in program generosity, but 
rather increased generosity. Because of this potential problem, instru 
mental variables are used in the next set of estimates. But the choice of 
instruments is not compelling, in the following ways.
Expenditures on the blind and the elderly are used as instruments. 
According to the statistical test reported, they work well. Yet at least on 
an intuitive basis, neither of these groups seems able to fully measure 
the breadth of a state's Medicaid program. Blind persons tend to be 
healthy, so their medical expenditures will not reflect the scope of a 
state's Medicaid program. And differences in expenditures of the aged 
across states are likely to reflect differences in nursing home access 
rather than in breadth of acute and chronic coverage. Preferable instru 
ments would seem to be expenditures by disease category. This would 
require background information on the basis for a disability determina 
tion, which is not available in Current Population Survey data. One 
suggestion, drawing on an alternative data set, is to identify groups by 
expected expenditures—grouping, for example, into the following four 
categories: low cost, low technology, high technology, and experimen 
tal and related groups. This also suggests that using SIPP data may be 
preferable, although the time span would be shorter.
Finally, other factors that may or may not be fully taken into account 
may help explain the growth in SSI and Medicaid enrollment among 
adults.
• Reduced coverage of private insurance over this same time 
period, resulting in more co-payments and less coverage for other 
family members. This could explain some of the growth in SSI 
and Medicaid spending.
• Poor health, which reduces potential wages. This is also part of 
the utility-maximization framework and should be incorporated 
into the model.
• The increase in the number of AIDS cases. Many of these people 
are covered by SSI and Medicaid; $55 million was spent on AIDS 
in 1989, $280 million in 1992 and $500 million in 1994. The
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number of persons covered for AIDS differs substantially across 
states.
• There may also have been significant changes in the treatment 
and diagnosis of many illnesses over this period, which would 
also influence expenditures over time.
• Some drug addicts and alcoholics have become recipients of SSI 
and Medicaid during this period, and 75 percent of these persons 
are in two states—California and Illinois. If their use of medical 
care differs significantly from that of traditional recipients, the 
means of these states would be influenced by these persons in 
ways that would not represent true differences in the expected 
value of Medicaid across the states.
This type of research could be improved through the use of data 
sets, such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation, with 
more information on health conditions, as well as through the use of a 
new data set—the supplement to the National Health Interview Survey, 
which oversamples and resamples persons with disabilities. Use of 
such data may allow some additional work on how to create better 
groupings by diagnosis to predict the value of Medicaid, in particular 
to test whether those requiring greater expenditures are more likely to 
apply.
Given the available data, this author has done a good job of explor 
ing the role of Medicaid in explaining the recent growth of SSI. The 
chapter provides evidence to convince us that Medicaid is an important 
factor in accounting for that growth.
